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Farmers above the out let ; Irrígators and 
Canal Management ín South Asía 
ROBER CHAMBERS* 
A b s t r a c t 
Jn developing and studying farmers' participaron on canal irrigation 
system in South Asia, both government programmes and social science rcse-
arch have concentracted their attention at the field leve/. Often the aim has 
beesn to induce farmer participation to distribute water, maintain watercourses, 
ancf resofve confücts, all below the outlet. But in practice, much of irrígators' 
spontaneous collective action is found not below bul above the outlet, in 
terriíory which is formal/y the domain of official irrigation management 
orgs.nisations. This spontaneous action is most common among tailenders, 
and iakes forms such as fact-finding, local negotiation, lobbying, appropriating 
gusí-ciig, operating controis, construction, water capture and maintenance. 
Through these activities. groups seek to assure themselves a better water 
supply. 
Manageriaily, the physical araa above the outlet is often a no person's land 
or "jungie" in which groups actively compete when water is scarce unpredi-
ctahle or untimely Securing a better water supply is so important to irrígators 
that their spontaneous collective action can demónstrate impressive degrees of 
organisation, cohesion and leadership, and exeludes partisan politics. An 
a/ternative to spontaneous action is forma/ joint management (FJM) by irriga-
tion staff and farmers. This has been developed more in Sri Lanka than 
Pakistan or India. FJM can take the ferm of lar ge open meetings of officials 
and farmers at project or subproject leve/, of channel or zonal committees, and 
of pro/ect-level committees. Farmers' participation and Joint commiüees which 
have been evolved on the Minipe and Gal Oya projeets in Sri Lanka offer a 
prcrmising approch. Forthe future, questions indude how major an opportu-
nity FJM presents for improving canal irrigation performance in South Asia, 
and in what conditions and how it con and should be promoted. 
*lnst¡tute of Deveiíopment Studies, Universily of Sussex, Brighton, Ericl nd 
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D e f i n i t i o n s 
In this paper, the fol lowíng meanings are attri-
buted to words and phrases : 
f o r m a l j o i n t managemen t (FJM) — recurrent 
officially recognised management activities above 
the outlet invclving both farmers and irrigation 
staff. 
g roup — whether organisted or not, the farmers 
in a hydrologically defined zone, normally the 
área below the outlet, with common interests. 
i m p r o v i n g p e r f o r m a n c e — means enhancing 
productivity, equity and sustainability while 
minimising adverse effects. 
m a i n sys tem — the canal system above the 
outlet, including diversions, works, reservoirs, 
main canals, branch canals, distributaries and 
minors. 
o u t l e t — the structure on canal irrigation system 
at which water control and management are 
usually, at least in theory, handed over from the 
irrigation staff to farmers. 
The Pro fess iona l F ixa t ion : B e l o w t h e 
O u t l e t 
Most of the interest in farmers' participation 
on canal irrigation systems has been in activities 
at the fie!d level, that is, below the outlet. 
Governmerit-operated canal irrigation systems 
typically have a bureaucracy responsible for 
managing the main system. while farmers are 
responsible for water distribution below the 
outlet. The area below the outlet, known as the 
chak in North India, includes watercourses, field 
channels, farmers' fields and field-levei drains. 
Main systems can range in size of command area 
from about 200 hectares to 2 mill ion; chaks are 
usually between 5 and 100 hectares. Many 
attempts have been made, and continué to be 
made in South Asia, especially through the 
Command Area Development Programme in 
India, (Ali 1983, Pant 1984, Singh 1984), and 
through various programmes in Sri Lanka, to 
promote and sustain farmers' groups or organis-
ations at the chak level. 
There are many reasons for this focus of 
attention. Most obvrously, the field level is 
where management and its effects - erosion, 
flooding and so on - are most visible. It is con-
veniently beyond the main system - the physical 
area of responsibility of the estabíished irrigation 
bureaucracies, and what happens there can be 
attributed to the ignorance or incompetence of 
farmers. It has also been acceptable for resear-
chers and for Government prográmales under the 
aegis of other departments, to operate below the 
outlet. In Pakistán, the research and develop-
ment work of the Colorado State University 
Project over a period of some ten years was for 
institutional and po'itical as well as professional 
reasons mandated to confine its work below the 
mogha (outlet). When transmission losses 
below the mogha were found to be much higher 
than believed by the Irrigration Department, 
attention focussed below the mogha evsn more. 
In both Pakistan and India, large-scale program-
mes have been mounted to improve performance 
on canal irrigation systems through what is 
termed 'on-farm development' (OFD) which 
means development of structures. watercourses 
and fields below the outlets In India, the Com-
mand Area Develooment Programme (CADP) 
launched in 1975 was kept off the main systems 
by Irrigation Departments in most States, and 
forced to confine its attention to trying to imprve 
performance through OFD below the outlets. 
The scale of operation was impressive, to co^er 
1 02 projects w i th an ultímate irrigation potential 
of about 18 million hectares by 1 984 It is also 
striking, in both Pakistan and India, how 
departmental territorial thinking and behaviour 
confined research, and physical and managerial 
activities below the outlet, in the territorial 
margin were beyond the professional 
concern of the irrigation engineers who managed 
the main systems. . 
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Sociologists and social anthropologists have 
reinforced this f is ld- level focus. They like to 
study communities, and community-mana'ged 
irrigation has a iarge liter^ture which reflects 
their attention. "R>ey have contributed notably 
to policy and practice with 'communals', espe-
cially in the Philippines. Coward, who pioneered 
in this field, identif ied three main functions 
needed and performed by communities of 
irrigators on communals after the original 
construction: d istnbut ion of water, maintenance 
of structures, and confl ict resolution. As atten-
tion was graduaíly transferred from commands 
to farmers' organisation below outlets on larger 
systems, these same three categories were 
applied, and observation and analysis concent-
rated on what happened below the outlet From 
a practical point of view, the question was 
whether there w e r e lessons from experience 
with communals wh ich could be transferred to 
these larger canal systems. This fitted the 
concerns of OFD. Research and practice were 
mainly concerned wi th farmers' participaron in 
design and construction for OFD, maintenance 
of watercourses and structures, distnbution of 
of water between farmers, and conflict resolu-
tion. The mCdel i n the minds of administrators, 
engineers, agricu?íuralists, and social science 
researchers alike had the outlet as the handover 
point The irrigation bureaucracy was respon-
sible for structures, decisions and actions above 
the outlet, and the farmers (and in India the 
CADA) for structures, decisions and actions 
below the outlet 
This división delayed perception of needs 
and opportunities. On the positive side, to be 
sure, CADA brought government staíf into 
closer contact w i t h farmers, and initiated a long 
learning process, describea by Syed Hashim Ali 
(1981) in which fndian government staff and 
World Bank staff changed their priorities from 
Innd consolidaron and land levelling to OFD and 
rotational distributíon of water below the outlet. 
On the negative side, OFD, 'farmers participa-
- v 
Vol. 6, No. 2, July 19SS 
t ion', and water users association, by whatever 
ñame, provided a convenient means for shifting 
responsiblity to farmers for those difficult tasks 
which irrigation bureaucracies were not able or 
wil l ing to undertake. These coincided with the 
concerns which sociologists and social anthro-
pologists transferred from their studies of 
communals, namely distributíon of water, 
maintenance of watercourses, and conflict 
resolution. The practica! question became how 
farmers' organisations could be set up on canal 
irrigation systems to perform these difficult 
functions which were both beyond the scope 
of irrigation bureaucracy and of interest to 
sociologists. 
At the same time, in the latter 1 970s and 
early 1980s, evidence accumulated that many 
of the problems in canal irrigation oricinated in 
the blind spot of main system management 
(Wade and Chambers 1980). It was increas-
ingly recognised that a predictable, adequate 
and timely delivery of water through outlets 
was a precondition for farmers' participaron in 
more equitable and productive distributíon 
below the outlet and in maintenance of water-
courses, and that it could also dimínish conflict. 
Earlier the tendency had been to blame the 
victims and te'l them to cure themselves; but 
more and more it was rea'ised that one deep 
cause of the sickness was the failure to supply 
what the victims needed. Bad water manage-
ment below the outlet, poor maintenance of 
watercourese, and conflict between farmers 
were not independent maladies which farmers 
inflicted on themselves, but rather symptoms 
of defíciencies in the main system and its 
management. 
The Farmer 's Front ier : A b o v e t he Ou t l e t 
Official concern for participaron below the 
outlet focussed, on what it would be ccnvenient 
for officíals if farmers would do, and how they 
could be orgínised to do these things. Sponta-
neous activities below the outlet were known. 
U 
On canal irrigation in South India, for example, 
one widespread practice was the appointment by 
villagers of 'common jrrigators' responsible for 
applying water to the fields. Maintenance of 
f ield channeis was aiso undertaken. Conflicts 
were resolved in various manners, usuaMy by 
respected villagers. It seemed a natural develop-
ment for Government itself to encourage and 
initiate such organisations, and many attempts 
were made in India under the aegis of the CADP, 
but with only limited success. 
The focus below the outlet diverted attention 
from the spontaneous activities of farmers above 
the outlet, described especially for South India 
by Robert Wade (1979, 1982). Taking South 
and Southeast Asia together, the evidence is 
scattered, and some of it is a few sentences here 
and there in papers devoted to other subjects. 
But taken together, it indicates that activity by 
farmers above the outlet is often varied, extensive 
and powerfully motivated. 
The ev idence s h o w s seven ac t i v i t ies : 
(i) Fact-finding 
(ii) local negotiation 
(iii) lobbying 
(iv) appropriating 
(v) guarding 
(vi) operation 
(vii) construction, capture and maintenance 
Let us examine these in turn 
(i) f a c t - f i n d i n g . Fact finding is a continuous 
process. Farmers seek information on many 
subjects and from many sources. The most 
important subject is water availability, but others 
include Irrigation Department and other budget 
allocations, priorities fór engineering and main-
tenance works, the comparative bribes being 
paid by other villagers or groups, and visits 
of ministers, local politicians and sénior bureau-
crats. The sources of information include 
gauge registers of the Irrigation Department; 
personal observatious of f lows; newspapers. 
official letters, notices, and gazettes; and infor-
mal discussions for example when travelling en 
buses (Ramamurthy 1985). 
The most common fact-finding above the 
outlet is visits to íinrl out what water is available 
and where water is going. On large systems 
based on storage reservoirs, influsntial and 
well-educated farmers sometimes make long 
journeys to see for themselves how mach water 
there is. 
Farmers in the Cauvery delta in Tamil Nadu 
make annual visits to the Mettur dam. more 
than 200 kilometres away, to assessthe season's 
water availability. On another large Indian 
canal system with an interstate water supply, 
farmer leaders went to the handover point 
between the States to find out from the engi-
neers how much water they actually handed 
over and to crósscheck the statements of 
engineers in their own State. They also checked 
control structures which they had been told 
were not working (Ramamurthy 1 982). More 
generally, farmers walk, bicycle, or traval by 
vehicle up their canal system to monitor the 
distribution of water, particularly to find out how 
much water is being taken by upstream farmers, 
villages, and other channeis. 
( i i ) loca l n e g o t i a t i o n : Negotiations 
with other irrigator groups or communities and 
with low level officials are widespread, though 
unlikely to be observed by visitors. They can 
take place in a formal, planned manner between 
villages or groups, and may take many hours, 
with each side putting forward its arguments 
many times until a solution partially acceptable 
to all is hammered out (Ramamurty 1985). Or 
informal arrangements may be made among 
farmers for the sharing of a limited supply (see 
Cerdan and Svendsen 1981 for a Philippines 
example). They may go as a group to ask 
upstream to take less water so that more wi l l 
f low downstream. Some negotiations lead to 
understandings which become principies or 
rules for water sharíng, such as agreement that 
12 IWR-S, Journal 
nfor-
ig on 
i the 
lable 
tems 
and 
long 
/ater 
Jadu 
nore 
on's 
dian 
>piy, 
>o¡nt 
ngi-
ided 
> of 
:ked 
told 
lore 
by 
the 
i o w 
ers. 
ons 
and 
ugh 
can 
een 
urs, 
ínts 
¡ble 
Or 
3ng 
see 
nes 
ask 
vi l l 
to 
or 
i'at 
four days of water issue are for a downstream 
village and three days for an upstream one. 
When such arrangements are found ¡t may be 
forgotten that there was a t ime when they were 
first negotiated and established. Negotiation 
and renegotiation can be Mntense activities in 
times of water shortage. 
(¡ü) l o b b y i n g . Lobbying entails approaches 
to officials and politicians at a higher level. It 
can be politcal lobbying, involving the use of 
political pressute, or bribing in various forms.1 
Lobbying through pol i t ical pressure can 
take the form of a mass delegation. In Sri 
Lanka, a group of 50 to 100 farmers are known 
to go en masse to see the officer in charge of 
of a system to draw attention to a water 
shortage in their area (Jayewardene 1985). 
A village in South India may send a delegation 
to an engineer, a District administrator, a Member 
of Legislative Assembly, or to a State capital 
itself. Also for South India, Ramamurthy (1985) 
reports that lobbying has variants like 
'Getting the help of polit icians through 
representations and telegrams, boycott ing 
elections, publ ishing articles in newspapers, 
blackmailing irrigation off icials and making them 
answerable to their sénior officers, creating a 
gadbad (a stir or commotion), haranguing, etc. 
Lobbying invoives a; gre^t .dea! of t ime, cost 
and effort travelling to meet sénior government 
officials in the irrigation and revenue depart-
ments or politicians or both wining and dining 
them on 'site' visits.' 
Lobbying through polit ical pressure is 
probably almost universal, whereas bribing, 
though common, is probably less so. Al l the 
same, in places it is a deeply entrenched conven-
tion (Wade 1979, 1982a) . Ramamurthy (1985) 
again states that farmers consider bribes to all 
levéis of Irrigation Department staff to be 
necessary to achieve their ends. They are paid 
in various forms - cash, gold, grain, petrol or 
diesel consumer durables, construction materials, 
alcoholic drinks and parties. Quite large sums 
of money raised for such purposes in a village 
may be handed over. 
The concessions sought through political 
pressure and bribing can be very valuable to 
farmers. Almost all are concerned with impro-
ving the water supply, either indirectly through 
stopping or securing the transfer of an irrigation 
official (Pant 1985) , or directly, for exampie, 
through releases of more water, or construction 
(such as a link channel or a larger outlet pipe) 
to assure a better supply, or rights to irrígate 
more paddy instead of drier crops, Or water for 
a standing crop after 'he final date for water 
issues. 
(¡v) a p p r o p r i a t i n g . Farmers appropriate 
water through physical action. One common 
form is the raid upstream, when a group of 
farmers or labourers go by foot, bicycle, tractor 
or jeep up a canal and physically remove checks, 
open or cióse gates, or install obstacles. A 
typícal example is how during stress periods on 
the IViinipe Scheme in Sri Lanka, desperóte 
farmers whether individually or collectively 
block the main channel, di'stributary or 
field channels w i th timber or stones, and 
damage channel structures and cut 'bunds 
(Wickamasekera 1981 ' 3 4 - 5 ) . Such acts may 
be carried out opent ly w i th a show of forcé. 
In South India, i t i s kbown for tail end villages 
to hire a jeep and to budget for its costs out of 
their common fund raised for such purposes, 
and then for farmers to patrol the main cana! 
lowering sluice gates and threatening violence. 
Occasionally a whole lorry load of farmers 
wi l l go, brancishíng sticks in a demonstraron 
of forcé (Ramamurthy 1985) . 
Appropriatíon through physical acts risks 
retaliation either from officials or from irrigators 
who W i l l lose as a result. Farmer groups try to 
avoid action which would harm and upset their 
neighbours (Ramamurty 1985) . For example, 
for Sri Lanka, Jayewardence (1985) reports 
that 
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that ¡f tailenders in a particular D-channel 
find that they do not receive an adequate 
supply of water because of over use 
by the headenders, they would still not 
try to control such outlets. Instead they 
wi l l attempt to increase the inflow to the 
D-channel from the Main Canal. Though that 
act would also cause some problems to another 
group of farmers at a further end, it is likely 
that they are not aware of tnis.' 
In a case in the Philipoines, direct action to 
reduce supDlies to other groups is only taken 
after careful assessment of how seriously the 
action would be taken. Svendsen, describing 
what actually happens on the üpper Pamoanga 
River Integrated Irrigation System (UPR1I3) 
observes that every effort is made to avoid open 
conflict : 
'When the purpose of a raid is to open an 
upstream check blocking the sublateral, it wi l l 
usually be undertaken at night to minimize the 
chance of encountering the farmers who placed 
the check. It the check is being guarded even 
at night, the assumption is that the need for 
water there is serious and the check wil l usually 
be left alone. Unguarded checks, on the other 
hand, are assumed to be diverting unneeded 
water and wi l l be opened. 
When water is tight, farmers all along the 
sublateral wi l l normally know the status of 
upstream checks and the Iength of time they have 
been in place. When a raid is made, it is often 
wi th the foreknowledge of minimal resistance to 
the action. In one interesting case. Water 
Management Technicians regularly act as go-
betweens among groups of farmers. An upstream 
W M T would indícate to his downstream counter-
part those upstream groups which were nearly 
íinished irrigating and whose checks could pro-
bably be safely opened. This information is then 
passed on to downstream farmers of the second 
WMT. Farmers then send a delegation upstec-m 
to open the checks, allowing water to pass on 
downstream.' ( 1 9 8 1 : 1 9 ) 
(v) guard ing Guarding upstream is widely 
reported. The village of Vinaysgapuram in North 
Arcot District, Tamil Nadu, posts night guards on 
the supply channel it maintains to prevent obstr-
uctions by the upstream village of Konaiyur 
(Chambers 1977 : 358-9). When the village of 
Trawan on the Soné Command in Bihar was 
suffering because the upstream village of Arap 
was cutting open the distributary, the Tarwan 
irrígators were organised to take turns keeping 
watch and as a result receíved more dependable 
and adequate water (Pant and Verma 1 983 : 47 ) . 
On some South Indían canals common ¡rrigators 
appointed by village irrigation committees have 
guarding sluices as one of their functions (Wade 
1979). Sometimes, if the threat of violence ¡s 
great. farmers take part and as many as 8 or 
more wil l camp at a sluice particularly at night 
(Ramamurthy 1985). Wade reports that for one 
village with a relatively high degree of organis-
ation, these common irrígators patrol the distri-
butary and check that higher-up villages are not 
blocking the f low or keeping their sluice outlets 
too high. At times of considerable water scarcity 
a jeep or tractor may be hired to take large 
numbers of men — common ¡rrigators and others 
who may join them to gíve a show of strength— 
higher up and keep them provisioned. In normal 
times less intense patrolling is carried out, tcge-
ther wi th posting three o r fou r labourers paíd to 
stand guard at a crucial fork a f ew miles upstream 
(Wade 1979 : 7) . Common ¡rrigators were 
found in 9 out of 24 villages, all 9 being tailen-
ders (ibid 11-12). There can also be under-
standíngs about how far to go. One village 
which from its taílend positíon would be expected 
to guard sluices does not do se because that 
would be an open provocation to the immediately 
neighbouring village across whose land the 
supply channel f lows. Wade reports that men 
of the downstream village often pass up and 
down the channel in comíng to and from the 
village, keep a constant check on irrigation there 
at the same time, and 'not infrequently cometo 
blows' (¡bíd 15). Ñor is it only downstream 
villagers who guard' upstream Ramamurthy has 
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noted (1982) that upstream villages also post 
guards to see tha t nobody from the lower 
reaches ¡nterferes. 
(v i ) o p e r a t m g One Wglected aspect of 
farmers' activities above the outlet is the extent 
to which they acfcually operate and manage the 
system. This negtect is scarcely surprising, since 
such management is contrary to official theory 
and does not accord with common professional 
views of farmer sgnorance and incompetence. 
Except in the form of 'deviant behaviour' such as 
damage to structures or placing obstacles in 
channels, farmers* operation of controls is easy to 
overlook because i t is not physically conspicuous. 
Farmers' abrtfdes to operate and manage 
are demonstrated remarkably by what they show 
they con do on communal systems Perhaps 
the best documented large communal system 
is Chhalis Mau]a in Nepal (Pradhan 1983) 2 
This 150-year o !d system has a 12 km channel 
irrigating nearly 3 X ' 0 0 hectares in originally 36 
but now 54 vilPages, affecting some 25,000 
people. It has a three-tisr representative 
structure, and weí'3 developed rules and methods 
for maintenance, detecíion and punishment of 
infringements, and allocation and distributíon 
of water. The ertíire. project- is 'run by farmers 
themselves. It is, moreover, only one of several 
examples in Nepal of irrigation projects of this 
size or larger wh icn are managed by'communities 
{ i b i d : 36). Sm3lfer in scale. but still impressive, 
is the organisatvon of 13 villages under the 
Dusi-Mamandur tank in North Arcot District, 
Tamil Nadu whidh besides carryíng out large-
scale works, issuss requests to the engineer in 
cbarge for watar releases from the tank, and in 
effect manages much of the issue and distribu-
tíon of water over a command area of 1645 
hectares (Chambers 1977; Elumalai 1980). A 
further instance, much cited ¡n the Indian 
literature, is the ¡Vlohini Irrigation Socíety on the 
Ukaí-Kakrapur irrigation system in Gujarat 
(S ;ngh 1981:49: Sinha 1983; Chowdhary and 
Kalra 1983; Sincrh 1984) reported to have a 
culturable command area of 420 ha, with a 
minor canal managed by the cooperative society. 
Intríguing findings (Svendsen 1981) near 
the taíl of the 100,000 hectare UPRIIS irrigation 
system in the Philippines raíse the question of 
how widespread de facto operation by farmers 
may be above the outlet, whatever the official 
theory. The original intention on UPRIIS was 
that water would be issued to 50 ha rotational 
areas (RAs) ahd that the official responsibílity 
of the Water Management Technologist would 
end just below the turnout to the RA at which 
point farmer management would take over. In 
practice, the actual handover of responsibílity 
took place much hígher up the system than in 
the theoretical model. RA turnout gates were 
meant to be operated by irrigation staff In 
fact, where the gates were operable, farmers 
affected by them normally had their own wren-
ches, allowing them to open and cióse the gatc 
at wil l . In almost all cases, control of water 
through the RA turnouts was in farmer hands. 
Svendsen continúes the next level of control in 
the system is exercised by checking in sublaterals 
which is often necessary to cause turnouts to f low. 
In the study areas, these checks too were often, 
though not always, under farmer control. Fre-
quently, the first significant control by irrigation 
system personnel is encountered at the structures 
joining sublaterals to their parent laterals. 
Functíonal farmer control thus typically extends 
the length of the sublateral, over blocks several 
hundred hectares in size' ( ib id. 18) 
The control is not, however, exerc;sed through 
any formal organisation, but through loosely 
structured and recurring activities, the upstream 
raid among them. 
A similar pattern was found on Gal Oya in 
1980, before the rehabilitaron project started. 
Control of distributary channel gates was 
effectively in farmer's hands. As soon as the 
irrigation department staff member (Jala Palaka) 
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hod bicycled o f f after closing a gate, farmers 
would go out wi th their home-made keys and 
change the setting at wi l l (Uphoff 1985a). The 
Irrigation Department appeared to have aban-
doned control of many parts of the systems. 
Murray-Rust carne to a similar conclusión 
after a very detailed study of Gal Oya: 
Farmers have established informal control 
over water at signif icantly higher levels in the 
system than formally designated. It is highly 
improbable that the Irrigation Department couid 
ever regain control over water down to the level 
of individual field channeis, both because they 
are unlikely to have sufficient resources and 
because farmers may opt for different patterns of 
water distribution than those proposed by the 
Department' 
Farmer control above the outlet is evidently 
widespread. That farmers are capable of 
operating a canal irrigation system coverlng 
thousands of hectares is shown by the Chhatis 
Mauja and Dusi-Mamandur cases, both of which 
require considerable organisation. (This is not. 
however, to say that they necessarily manage 
the systerns either better or worse than a separate 
bureaucracy) That farmers in practice operate 
controls higher than the outlet is shown by the 
UPRIIS and Gal Oya cases, and suggested 
by reports of 'farmer interference' on 
main systems elsewhere. On Malaprabha in 
Karnataka Vedulia found so much crossbun-
ding and blocking of pipes by farmers that he 
could only measure unimpeded actual f lows, 
in order to compare them with designed flows, 
when water was not being used by farmers 
(cited in Rao and Sundar 1 9 2 5 : 5 7 ) . It was 
noted many times that the minors and outlets 
were operated by the interested farmers 
with or without the knowledge of the patkari-
(irrigation off ical). Ramamurty ' (1985) notes 
that 'farmers are continuously operating and 
controlling the main canal system and distri-
buta rfes' but that this often has to be cfone 
clandestinely. A'nd perhaps this very secrecy 
has concealed from observers and analysts that 
de facto control by farmers of the lower parts 
of main systems is the rule rather than the 
exception.. 
( v i i ) c o n s t r u c t i o n , cap tu re and main te-
nance. Especially where they have no water, 
or water is scarce, farmers can be found going 
to great lengths in contruction and maintenace 
work in order to secure it. 
Once-for-ail construction can be undertaken 
to capture, augment or assure a group's water 
supply. This is most conspicuous and most 
observed not above but below and at the out-
let. Niranjan Pant (1985) visited a médium 
irrigation project in Rajasthan where the main 
canal and minors had been constructed ancí 
lined, but the farmers left to construct water-
courses ane field channeis. He found farmers 
engaged in deep rock cutting, including blasting, 
high fil l ing up to 0 75 metres, and much 
excavation work, in one case over 2 kms long. 
Another common intervention by farmers is the 
installation of 'unofficial' outlets on a minor or 
distributary. On UPRIIS, turnouts irom the 
main system had not infrequently been sited 
and constructed by farmer (Svendsen 1981 >. 
On North Indian and Pakistan canal irrigation 
farmers sometimas change the size of the outlet 
pipe so that the whole group gets more water. 
Similarly, though much less observed, 
farmers have shown themselves abie to under-
take substantial once-for-ail works above outlets 
in order to capture water supplies from main 
systems. On one South Indian canal, farmers 
camped and dug a 300-foot channel 70 feet 
wide to a depth of 26 to 30 feet in order to 
obtain a better water supply. They have been 
found undertaking wotks on main systems 
including digging new channeis, deepening. 
widening or lining channeis, changing align-
ments, constructing diversión structures, rein-
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forcing embankments, replacing or removing 
pipes or sluice gates that obstruct f lows, 
devising ways t o reuse waste water f íows 
through drains and check -dams, digging wells 
to collect seepage f lows, and so no (Ramamur-
thy 1982, 1985) . On the Wagón Project in 
Rajasthan in the mid-1980s, farmers were 
trying to use furvds from a large temple visited 
by lakhs of devotees each year to build an 
additional minor canal (Lowdermilk 1985). In 
such works, the technical advice of engineers 
may be enlisted. On Gal Oya in Sri Lanka, when 
the desilting of a distributary channel during 
rehabilitation decreased water f low into one of 
the field channeis, the farmers' organisation 
obtained permission and technical advice from 
the Irrigation Department officer in charge of 
the area and bui l t a stone check structure in 
the distributary channel w i th shramadana 
(votuntary communal) labour (Abeyratne et al 
1984:12). On t he Pochampad Project in 
Andhra Pradesh, sn several cases farmers, under 
the technical supervisión of the engineers, 
deepened channeis so that water could reach 
some outlet commands. Had the farmers not 
done so, delays in official procedures could 
have deprived them of water for several irriga-
tion seasons (Singh 1984:15). 
Farmers also combine for recurren! activities 
to capture and maintain their supplies. Each 
year the farmers under Dusi-Mamandur mobilise 
labour and organise lorries to carry them 1 5 to 
20 km to the -off take of the Rajakkal channel 
which supplies their tank. A temporary barrier 
is then made in the Palar river to divert water 
into the channel. One reason why farmers 
undertake this w o r k is because it requires timeli-
ness and speecJ of a sort it is diff icult for the 
PWD to muster (Chambers 1977; Elumalai 1 980) 
Another probably quite widespread pheno-
menon is the seasonal construction of brushwood 
weirs by "encroachers' ' to capture drainage 
return flows f rom headreaches, as found on 
Kaudulla in Sú^Lanka. Faimers also undertake 
emergency repairs: when there was too much 
water in a distributary on Gal Oya in Sri Lanka 
and the channel was about to breach, farmers 
built it up themselves (Uphoff 1 984). Desilting 
is another activity carried out by farmers above 
the outlet. On Minipipe in Sri Lanka, sh ramdana 
for desilting the main channel was organised by 
a Buddhist voluntary agency (Wickramasekera 
1981:63) and on Chhatis Mauja in Nepal desilting 
the main canal is considered to be the most 
important event in the management of the system 
(Pradhan 1983:231). In Andhra Pradesh 
(Ramamurthy 1984) and Rajasthan (Pant 1985) 
farmers clean main system channeis which lie 
upstream of them. 
Officials often complain that farmers are 
unwil l ing to do maintenance work above the 
outlet. There are several reasons for this: main-
tenance can be costly and tedious; the boundary 
of responsibility between farmers and government 
sometimes shifts and may not be clearly 
established, so that it is sensible for farmers to 
wait and see if government wi l l do the work; 
farmers may fear that if the do the work main-
tenance funds allocated for their channeis wi l l be 
diverted elsewhere (Jayewardene 1985); it is 
diff icult for farmers to get together for collective 
activities anyway; and most important, they may 
only see a collective interest in doing maintenance 
work if their water supply wi l l benefit substanti-
ally-rarely the case tor top-enders on distributaries 
and minors wi th moderately adequate supplies. 
The instances citad above show that where 
farmers do see a clear gain in their water supply, 
they can be wil l ing to put in their labour; but the 
incentives do have to be obvious and strong. 
Spontaneous A c t i o n Ana lysed 
To analyse scattered data comparatively is 
is hazardous. What fol lows combines com-
parison, inference and guesswork Rather than 
presenting conclusions, it seeks to identify 
working hypotheses and questions for further 
investigaron. The aim is to understand why 
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¡rrigators do what they do above the outlet so 
that later we can speculate on how these 
interests and drives could help ¡mprove system 
performance. 
The analysis falls under five heads : 
(i) irrigators' first prioríty 
(i¡) the jungle 
(¡ü) group boundaries, cohesion and leadership 
(¡v) too important for partisan politics 
(v) preconditions for action 
( i) ¡ r r iga tors ' f i r s t p r i o r í t y 
Al l these activities above the outlet - fact-
finding, local negotiation, lobbying, appropriating, 
guarding, operating, construction, capture and 
maintenance - can and do occur spontaneously, 
that is, without being sponsored or organised by 
aovernment. In different places and conditions 
and at different times farmers are found getting 
together and doing them. Since all involve costs-
in time, money, labour, organisation or even 
physical risk - farmers must care a great deal 
about a successful outcome. If we can see 
what these activities have in common, we may 
have a clue to the springs of spontaneous farmer 
aciion above the outlet. 
It is obvious and also remarkable that al l 
seven ac t i v i t ies have t h e same ob jec t i ve : t o 
secure a be t te r w a t e r supp ly f o r t h e group. 
A better water supply may here be taken to be 
one which is among other things more adequate, 
timely and predictabln in the group's terms. 
Further support for this conculsion comes 
from two sources. 
The first is evidence that spontaneous 
farmer organisation is found where water is both 
scarce and unreliable, but where group action 
stands a good chance of improving it. This is 
usually towards the tailends of systems (Wade 
1979; Ramamurthy 1982 ).3 Spontaneous 
farmer's organisations have not been reported in 
headreaches where water is usually more 
adequate, tímery and predícatable. Ñor in the-
sense of groups of farmers with distinct differe-
utiated roles, are they found in one case where 
water supply, though scarce, is reliable. Th¡3 is 
the Northwest Indian warabandi as it is found ir? 
Punjab and Haryana where rigid self-policing 
rules for rationing scarcity between farmers are 
well established and jeaíousiy monitored by 
farmers themselves individually. The whole 
system ¡s now so well deveToped and accepted, 
it seems. that group action to secure more water 
would have limited scope and might be 
dangerous. 
The second evidence of the prioríty of 
securing a group's water supply. is a revealíng 
sequence of events in a tailend location on a 
South Indian canal (Wade 1982b). The water 
supply had earlier been adequate because of 
slow take-up of irrigation higher up the system. 
It then became meagre and unreliable for five or 
six years. Irrigation became expensive for 
farmers because each irr igation. toek longer, 
and labour had to be present to ensure 
that other farmers did not take water during the 
wett ing period. As the water supply felI, officials 
also demanded higher bribes for providing the 
supply. This became so expensive and diff icult 
that small farmers gave up irrigatíng altogether. 
Then the farmers of an area of 600 acres under 
three outlets got together to try to improve their 
water supply by concerted action. They contri-
buted to a common fund which they used for 
two purposes ¡n the first season One was to 
employ labourers to go highfr up the distributary 
to guard and ensure that their water supply was 
not stolen. The other was to bribe officials to 
release more water. At this stage they did not 
concern themselves with distributing the water 
below the outlets : the first task was to capture 
and assure it. When the results from the first 
season were encouraging, they comributed more-
money and amployed more labourers - a total of 
34 - and paíd them more to resist inducements 
from upstream irrigators. The plan was for 10 of 
these laboureres to guard upstream, and 24 to 
distribute the water beLow the outlets. But when 
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the i r upstream water supply was threatened the 
farmers sent 2 8 labourers upstream, and aban-
doned the idea that labourers would apply the 
water to the f ields. water^ cap tu re above t h e 
o u t l e t t o o k p r i o r í t y over w a t e r d í s t r i b u t i o n 
a n d a p p l í c a t i o n b e l o w i t : 
( í i ) t h e j u n g l e 
The canal system immediately above the 
outlet is quite o f ten a no person's land, a jungle. 
There are several reasons for this. Irrigation 
Departments responsible for main systems have 
nominal control a l l the way down to the outlets, 
bu t they do not always have the staff to manage. 
One response t o water management problems is 
t o extend deparimental control even further: the 
policy decisión in India to extend main system 
control down t o 5 to 8 ha chaks instead of 40 ha 
chaks is a case in point. However, low level 
staff may be t o o few, too immobile, or too poorly 
provided with incentives, to exercise the degree 
o f control recpuired, leaving an unadministered 
gap. Moreover„ especially where water is short 
they may lay themselves open to abuse, threats 
or violence if they enforce regulations by opening 
and closing out lets or conirols on minors or even 
distributaries. They may also be induced by 
farmer groups through gifts.io turn a blind eye 
and al low those wi th a moré intense interest in 
what happens to the water to appropriate 
or distribute the water themselves. For a quiet 
and safe life and modest profit, it can make sense 
for them to refrsln from control. 
To the extent that they withdraw, or fail to 
occupy the no person's land, they leave it to 
farmers. Competit ion for the water is defined as 
a group acivity foecause of the physical nature of 
the channels and outlets. As in so many realms 
of human conduct, the play of interest involves 
forcé, threat and tear of forcé, inducement, nego-
l iation, ¡deas o f equity; and legit imaron by 
precedent. As farmers are to each other below 
the outlets, so groups of farmers are to each 
other above. The geographical advantage of 
headenders is often reflected in conventions 
which give them priority, but intense resentmenl 
by tailenders can provoke confrontations which 
modify these. What starts as a jungle on a new 
irrigation system is partially regulated by prece-
dent and understanding, with an underlying 
threat of collective forceful action by others if 
any qroup goes too far. And just as an ampie 
supply of water to an outlet reduces competition 
and conflict between farmers, so an ampie supply 
to a minor or distributary reduces competition 
and conflicts between groups. In well-suppled 
headreaches, and elsewhere in good years, the 
jungle is peaceful and groups quiescent. In 
poorly supplied tailends, and in bad years, groups 
become active and predatory, trying through raids 
guarding, lobbying and negotiation to serve their 
cwn interests. 
( i i i ) g roup boundar ies , cohes ion and lead-
ership 
Spontaneous groups may be hydrologically-
based, comprising the farmers below one outlet, 
or more outlets, or on one minor; or socio-
pol i t ical ly-based-the village or community. 
Most of the organisations described by Wade 
in South India were village-based, representing 
collective interests which could cover several 
outlets. The organisations observed by Rama-
chandram (1S84) on the Periyar-Vaigai system 
in Tamil Nadu were also village-based. However, 
one of Wade's examples (1982b) entailed 
collective action by farmers under three outlets 
and coming from two different villages. Or an 
even larger geographical area may be represen-
ted, as w i th the pressure group described by 
Ramamurthy which set out to establish facts, 
publish a newsletter, and secure a better deal 
for many villages at the tailend of a large 
system. 
Many variables might be expected to influ-
ence the composition and cohesion of a spcnita-
neous group-a perceived collective deprivation 
interest or opportunity; social homogeneity 
leadership; traditions of collective action; size 
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of group; and other non-irrigation reasons for 
collective action (such as regulation of the 
grazing of village lands, as noted by Wade 
1979). Collective action may fall: social divi-
sions may be stronger than the pulí of common 
interests. as Merrey found in Gondalpur village 
in the Punjab (Pakistan) where factions and 
izzat - a non-zero sum concept of honour, 
status and 'face' - prevented cooperation and 
led to delioerate sabotage of rehabilitation and 
maintenance, even though the saboteur lost as 
a result (Merrey n.d., 1983, and 1985). On 
the other hand the forcé of common interests 
in securing water is supported by Wade's 
(1982b) threé outlet but two village example, 
which demonstrated successful organisation 
for 600 acres. This organisation included people 
from two villages, one of which surprisingly had 
' two strong factions, the enmity between 
whose leaders has been strong enough to 
prevent several kinds of village-based con-
certed action which are quite commonly 
found in villages in this area'. 
!t was agreed that any water disputes in 
the village involving these two factions would 
be taken for arbitration to the leader of the 
other village. 
The choice of group leaders and emissaries 
appears to be pragmatic. Local influentials may 
be expected and even required to represent 
collective interests in the outside world. In 
Tarwan village in the Soné Comrnand in Bihar, 
in August 1981 the executive committee had 
a meeting 'which decided that the president 
would contact higher irrigation officials for the 
maintenance of expected water in the distribu-
tory' (Pant and Verma 1683:47) . There can 
be here an element of noblesse obl ige. The 
village irrigation committee, or peddamanshu lu , 
found on . some South Indian systems, is com-
prised of respected gentlemen in whom the 
village can have confidence: being on the 
peüdamaushu lu is 'a diff icult and thankless 
task, that they would sometimes rather not 
perform' (Ramamurthy 1982). In one village, 
the same man took the lead role in all represen-
tations outside the village. He was not a large 
landlord, but a middle-sized working farmer who 
happened to be unusually articúlate (Wade 
1979 : 7). But the time involved is a cost which 
small farmers may not be wl l l ing to bear, and 
they may welcome leadership by the dominant 
class. They may not initiate an organisation 
'because they do not have the time, money, 
extra-local connections, transportation facili-
ties or status characteristics-dress, deport-
ment, language etc. Besides the fact that 
small farmers social rate of discount is 
rooted in the subsistence present, large 
farmers are often expected to provide 
services as liaison agents with the external 
world. just as they are expected to provide in 
times of emergency or at communal festival 
feasts. Small farmers may often benefit 
from larger farmers water mobilisation ende-
avours as 'free riders' as long as such ende-
avours enable them to gain more material 
advantage in the process'. (Ramamurthy 
1984 : 1 6 - 1 7 her emphasis.) 
However, they may not be entirely 'free 
riders' in thatthose who act on behalf of the 
group may expect other services or loyalty in 
return. 
Comparing Merrey's Gondalpur and Wades's 
South Indian case is instructive. No doubt there 
were cultural differences between the two areas 
which explain something. Beyond these, in 
Gondalpur the focus of conflict was below the 
outlet, interna! to the village and the watercourse, 
and the activity of rehabilitation and maintenance 
involved direct conflicts of interest. In the South 
Indian case there was an external focus, above 
the outlet and a common cause in which all 
could unite. In Gondalpur some were liable to 
lose; in the South Indian case, all stood to gain. 
Sometimes then, it can be easier for farmers to 
combine for activities above the outlet, where 
they are not meant to be, than for activities 
below the outlet, where government so often 
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seeks their participaron. In the South Indian 
case, common interests in securing a better water 
supply were strong enough to transcend simul-
taneously both inter-village boundaries and intra-
village factions. Indeed, 'a better water supply 
reduces internal competitionand confl ict. Far-
mers' activities above theoutlet externalise internal 
problems. Some of the more active groups 
above the outlet may even be those with stronger 
internal tensions. 
( i v ) t o o i m p o r t a n t f o r par t i san p o l i t i c s 
A striking feature of farmers' activities above 
the outlet is their desire to keep them separate 
from partisan politics. This comes over strongly 
in evidence f rom India, Nepal and Sri Lanka. 
In India, the pressure group studied by 
fíamamurthy was deliberately distanced from 
politics. Its leaders included persons prominent 
in three differer;t politicai parties. The President 
of the organisation expressed himself not dis-
appointed at delay in the publication of the 
organisation's news sheet because it was the 
time of an efection and if it were published 
then 'there is a chance that farmers think it is 
biased by partisan politics; since (the organisa-
tion) is essentialiv a non-party biased organisa-
t ion it is important that farmers get this message, 
especially in the first issue'. Another informant 
gave the blurr ing of aims with partisan politics 
as a reason for the failure of earlier similar 
organisations iRamamurthy 1982). 
In Nepal, on the Chhatis Mauja communal 
system, local poiit ics and irrigation management 
are kept separate, with priority to irrigation 
management. The central committee can mobi-
lize political forcé within the command area, 
but the committee members do not actively 
particípate in a political election campaign or 
in political activities. The elected Panchayat 
Pradhan, associated with partisan politics, is 
usually deliberalely not made chairman of the 
irrigation association (Pradhan 1 9 8 4 : 237) 
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In Sri Lanka, a project committee was 
elected on the Minipe scheme 'with a high 
degree of enthusiasm'. 'Partisan politics did 
not play any major role in the elections with 
representatives being selected from both the 
UNP and SLFP groups' (Wickramasekera 
1981 : 67). Again, on Gal Oya, a national 
system of elected or appointed farmer leaders 
called 'Yaya Palaka ' was not effective in 
mobilising farmer participation in operation and 
maintenance, one reason being that they were 
generally associated with political parties and 
political interests (Abeyratne et al 1984:16-17). 
Cióse observers of farmers' activities on Gal 
Oya were impressed by their determination to 
keep their organisations from becoming politi-
cized. The District Minister, recognising the 
valué of the non-political farmer organisations, 
avoided personal involvement wi th them. For a 
few days during the 1983 national election cam-
paign, spokesmen for both major parties in the 
district made the Gal Oya farmer organisation 
programme an issue but 'apparently behind-the 
scenes advice from farmers led both to drop 
the issue and the programme did not become 
embroiled in partisan politics as was to be 
feared'. In the words of one of the previously 
most prominent and partisan farmers in the 
area, 'politics is cáncer for farmer organisation' 
( i b id : 34). 
(v ) p recond i t i ons f o r ac t i on 
We can now postúlate preconditions for 
spontaneous collective activities above the 
outlet on bureaucratícally managed systems. 
These can be divided into those that are nece-
ssary, and those that are predisposing. 
These conditions appear necessary : 
— the group must have a common hydrological 
interest 
—water must have high valué to the group 
21 
—the group's water supply must be unsatisfa-
tory (¡nadequate, unpredictable, untimely, 
¡nconvenient (e.g. at night) etc.) 
— farmers must perceive a reasonable chance to 
¡mprove it 
Among many predisposing but not essential 
conditions, some of the more important are : 
—poor communications f rom management to 
farmers, so that farmers are uncertain- what 
they can expect to receive 
—absence of a reliable operational plan for water 
distributíon on the main system 
—lack of effective sanctions by officials or 
neighbours against raiding, poaching and other 
informal forms of appropriation 
—officials and politicians susceptible to influence 
and wi th power to change water distributíon 
— respected and capable leadership of the group. 
(to be concluded) 
A scientist, an engineer and a lawyer were asked the question : "What is 
two plus t w o ? " „ . - ' 
T!,e scientist immediately answered : "Two plus two equals four" . 
The engineer shook his head and retorted : "Approximately plus approximately 
t w o equal approximately four " . 
Both than turned to the lawyer and demanded : What is your answer ? What 
is two plus two ?" . 
The lawyer stared back and calmly replied : "What wou ld you like ¡t to be ?. 
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